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GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION:

I.

TRADEOFFS OR COMPLEMENTS?*

Introduction

If we can count on any underlying certainty with respect to the
international economic scene, it is that it is subject to severe shocks-
and likely to remain so.

It is, nevertheless, possible to recognize that

the events of the last few years have been particularly cataclysmic in
their impact, especially as far as the LDCs are concerned.

These events,

including oil, food and DC stagflation crises, have, among many other
consequences not relevant to this paper, increased the disparity among
the LDCs and helped bring into fuller focus the existence of large and
growing gaps within and between individual countries of the developing
and developed worlds.

With respect to the growing gaps between

the so-called Third and Fourth worlds, the political will among both old
and nouveau riche to do something mean~ngful about it still seems to·be
lacking; perhaps efforts under the still somewhat leaky umbrella of the
"new international economic order~ currently under discussion in many
quarters around the globe,will eventually begin to bear fruit.
important subject but one we do not intend to deal with here.

It is an
With respect

to the second and not wholly unrelated issue, which is the subject of this
paper, the answer lies less in the international setting and more in the
needs of a'new national economic order!' Here, growing awareness of the
problem has, moreover, not as yet been accompanied by either a commensurate
increase in unde~standing or a will to action.

As long as this understanding

remains incomplete, it is, of course, that much easier for the elites of the

*Paper presented to the Conference on Economic Development and Income
Distribution, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado,
April, 1976.
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developing countries--and others--to leave the matter at the rhetorical
level.

It will indeed be difficult for those inside the LDCs who would

like to change the current state of inequity--or those outside who would
like to help through advice and/or assistance--to be really effective in
the absence of further progress on this front.
We could of course argue a long while--but won't--on whether it is the
absolute poverty or the relative within-country distribution of income which
really represents the main problem.

Certainly, for populations living

near their caloric minima whose essential basic needs for food, clothing,
and shelter have not yet been satisfied, it is the condition of "low-end
poverty" that matters most.

But I think it is reasonable to assert that

for the vast majority of the populations of the developing world, certainly
once they've started in motion, it is not some Rawlsian lexicographic
ordering which affects their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction,
but their own (changing) standard of life relative to that of their country
men which is now increasingly visible and yet apparently increasinglv
unattainable. 1 The setting of "poverty lines" at $50 or $75 per capita,
or the racking up of "basic needs" with dollar or caloric equivalents, is
likely to reflect policy makers' aspirations rather than people's own
priorities and perceptions.

1 when we assign different weights to the achievement of GNP gains by
different groups (as proposed by Ahluwalia and Chenery--in Chapter XI of
Redistribution with Growth, Chenery et al., Oxford University Press, 1974),
we are acknowledging just that.
- -
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Another, and possibly more pragmatic, reason for preferring to con
centrate analysis on the relative rather than the absolute poverty issue
is that the relative position of families and/or regions can be more
easily integrated within the traditional general equilibrium analysis of
the economic system, whether focussed on growth, technology or employment.
Poverty at the low end of the income scale, whether in rich or poor coun
tries, is, after all, an arbitrary concept usually tackled by "after the
fact" measures, e.g., public employment, fiscal redistribution, food stamp
programs and other transfers--all"secondary'strategies, if by''primary"
strategy we mean the nature of the production process itself.

Once we

address the question of what happens to the poor, as tied to growth,
employment and other aspects of the development pattern itself, it becomes
analytically much easier to deal with relative rather than absolute poverty
issues.

This is because relationships between growth, employment and the

size distribution of income constitute a nexus which is in large part
linked up with technology choice and the functional distribution of income,
both of which are relative concepts.
With very few exceptions, 2 the LDC development plans of the '50s and
'60s dealt with employment and regional distribution objectives as part of
a secondary strategy which would have to be deployed, if somewhat half
heartedly, after the dust had settled on the primary, output-oriented

2
one such was Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).
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development program.

More recently, public works as well as nationaliza

tion have been added to the list of instruments in the tool kit.

The

fiscal redistribution of income from upper to lower income groups was
expected to pick up secondary demand and employment effects via the impact
of a different, more labor-intensive, final demand bundle.

Finally,

making the growth buggy move a little faster was expected to solve the
poverty, if not the equity, problem.
However, there now exists a growing consensus that at least centrally
planned public works programs intended to solve the national underemploy
ment and/or poverty problem are difficult to organize, blueprint and
maintain; secondly, that nationalization, even if its negative output effects
could be overcome, represents a clumsy instrument for redistribution via
prices in the mixed economy.

Thirdly, even if the notoriously low fiscal

capacity of LDC governments could somehow be repaired, results of research
at Rice and elsewhere

3

indicates rather plearly that the changes in final

demand composition required to make any real difference would be way out
of proportion to what is realistically feasible.

"Trickling down" to the

poor through higher growth rates is seen as another non-starter--though only a few
years ago Prebisch suggested this as a solution for Latin America--partly
because we·cannot expect to have enough development fuel to-put into the
development tank, and partly because, in any case, its consequences are
unambiguously bad for distribution.

3
see, for example, the work of R. Soligo and J. Land, as summarized in
J. Land and R. Soligo, "Consumption Patterns, Factor Usage and the Distribution
of Income: A Review of Some Findings," mimeo., Program of Development Studies
(Rice University), 1974.
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It is thus a sad but more or less generally agreed finding that,
at least for the mixed developing economy, the only reasonable hope of
doing something about poverty or distribution is through an attack on
the nature of the growth path itself, i.e., changes in the rules of the
output game, with or without a change in the distribution of initial chips
or assets.

Whether or not this conclusion is universally accepted, however,

does not, of course, settle, but only begins to address, the central question
of this paper, i.e., whether or not growth and distribution objectives,
while they need to be viewed together, are by nature likely to constitute
tradeoffs or complements, and/or in what specific types of situations they
are inclined to be competitive rather than complementary.

Finally, if these

two pivotal societal objectives are indeed to some extent competitive, we
might want to know how painful are these tradeoffs.
This, it seems to me at least, is finally the right question, i.e.,
if distribution can be analyzed only in the context of growth, how do we
in fact move towards an integration of either neoclassical or classical
development theory, for what types of economies, with what measures of
equity over time?

Regardless of which index of inequality is ultimately preferred,

and there are many ways of assessing the various measures available to us,

4

it is therefore necessary to relate it to the performance of the system in
its other,more familiar,aspects.

In other words, since income distribution

is usually "measurement without theory," linking it with other aspects of
the growth performance should enable us to ultimately arrive at some

4

see G. Fields and J.C.H. Fei, "On Inequality Comparisons," Economic
Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 202, Yale University, May 1974; also
A. B. Atkinson, "On the Measurement of Inequality," Journal of Economic
Theory, 2, No. 3, 1970, pp. 244-263.
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approximation to the aforementioned question.

In fact, it is probably

the only way to get from here to there.
Section II briefly describes the nature of the available evidence on
the relationship between growth and equity, mostly on the side of "trade-off
pessimism."

Section III makes an effort to present preliminary country

experience which goes counter to the current conventional wisdom.

Section IV

makes a brief attempt at drawing some conclusions.
II.

The Prevailing Evidence:

Trade-Off Pessimism

It is fair to say that the overwhelming evidence available to date
points in the direction of an inevitable, and rather severe, conflict
between most conventional measures of equity for a given society and its
growth performance.
Morris,

5

Working with cross-sections, Kuznets and Adelman and

find that LDC distributions, for instance, are substantially worse

than DC distributions; especially for the top 20% of the population, incomes
are clearly more equally distributed in the relatively rich countries.

6

5

s.

Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," American Economic
Review, 45, No. 1, 1955, pp. 1-28 and "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic
Growth of Nations: VIII, Distribution of Income by Size," Economic Develop
ment and Cultural Change, 11, No. 2, 1963, pp. 1-80; see also I. Adel.man and
C. T. Morris, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries,
Stanford University Press, 1973, using other than only income variables.
6

The gap is probably even understated since, in the rich countries,
there are more independent low-income households both at the very young and
very old end of the tail than in poor countries--see Irving Kravis, "Inter
national Differences in the- Distribution of Income," Review of Economics and
Statistics, 1960.
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7

Paukert --though he mixes family and individual income in some of his work-points out that countries,as they move from $100 to $200 incomes per capita,
reach a peak of income inequality, even if,

as Cline points out, 8 the in

verse U-shaped pattern is weaker within an LDC pattern of countries than when
we stretch the cross-section across DCs and LDCs.
Turning to time trends, these also appear to be generally favorable to
the trade-off hypothesis.

For example, Weisskoff finds income distribution

worsening in Argentina and Mexico, 9 as does Fishlow in the case of Brazii. 10
. evi"d ence f or th e Ph"l"
.
ll th a t income
.
d"is t ri"b u t"ion pro bbl
There is
i ippines
a y
worsened during recent periods of fairly rapid growth.
The point of this paper is not that this overwhelming mass of evidence
can somehow be denied, but, rather, that there also exists counter-evidence,
if admittedly less weighty in terms of the number of countries or their
representativeness, which should also be considered and which should at
least give us pause with respect to the inevitability of a conflict between
these two societal objectives.

The "deviant" countries, mainly Korea and

Taiwan, are deviant in two senses, i.e., their levels of Gini

7

r. Paukert, "Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development:
A Survey of Evidence," International Labour Review, 108, 1973, pp. 97-125.
8

w. R. Cline, "Distribution and Development," Journal of Development
Economics, 1, 1975, pp. 359-400.
9
R. Weisskoff, "I~come Distribution and Economic Growth in Puerto Rico,
Argentina and Mexico," The Review of Income and Wealth, December 1970.
10
A. Fishlow, "Brazilian Size Distribution of Income," American Economic
Review, May 1972.
11
G. Ranis, ed., Sharing in Development: A Programme of Employment,
Equity and Growth for the Philippines, International Labour Organization,
1974.
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are lower (in the .3 range rather than in the customary .5 range) and
their Ginis have not risen during the first period of rapid transition
growth.

In other words, "things did not have to get worse before they could

get better."

These two country cases are admittedly "special" cases, i.e., the

same pair which has previously given us "deviant" performance with respect
to their spectacular, by now well-known, employment and income performance.
Ditto for their related early departure from the general pattern of import
substitution growth and their move towards export substitution based on
mobilization of agriculture and the absorption of surplus labor in labor. t ensive
.
. d ustry. 12
in
in

It is thus perhaps not surprising that it is again

Korea and Taiwan--and perhaps, if we had the data, Japan historically as
well--which present evidence of unusually favorable levels and trends of
distribution along with rapid growth performance.
While we recognize, with alacrity, that no two countries areEYer the
same and that the "specialness" of these particular situations must be
acknowledged, it nevertheless seems instructive to look at them more closely
in terms of what pieces of the lesson are relevant or irrelevant to other
LDCs.

At a minimum, one successful counterexample is worth examining in

detail.

Moreover, it behooves us to look at other, less "special" cases to

see if, at least in certain subphases of development, a similar diminution
or elimination of the growth/distribution conflict can be observed.

For

example, Pakistan between 1961 and 1965, Colombia after 1967, Brazil between
1963 and 1968, the Philippines between 1964 and 1968, all represent historical

12

see J.C.H. Fei and G. Ranis, "A Model of Growth and Employment in
the Open Dualistic Economy: The Cases of Korea and Taiwan," Journal of
Development Studies, 11, No. 2, January 1975, pp. 32-63.
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episodes of deviation from the pronounced import substitution syndrome
and may turn out to represent interesting deviations from the generally
accepted trade-off phenomenon worthy of more detailed study.
Such an historical approach, if feasible, is,of course,to be preferred
to cross-sectional analysis for all the well-known reasons.

Hopefully, in

addition to the Taiwan case on which this is a brief progress report, other
longitudinal studies will soon become available. Two such studies are currently
13
Others, e.g., on Colombia
well along, i.e., on Korea and Pakistan.
by G. Fields, and on Japan by the IDCJ group, may be available before
too long.

At a minimum, we would hope that studies for other countries will

demonstrate that at least during particular periods of time when the overall
environment underwent some change, such environments were more conducive to
a softening or even an elimination of the observed conflict between growth
and distribution objectives.

Even though, at this stage of our knowledge,

a full understanding of the interrelations between growth and income dis
tribution still eludes us, a detailed examination of such "special case"
deviations from what is assumed to be the common trend may well be worth
the effort.

13

r. Adelman and S. Robinson's forthcoming book (Stanford University
Press) on Korea, and M. Ayub's Yale Ph.D. dissertation in progress, on
Pakistan.

-10-

What analysts and policy makers would presumably want to know, in
particular, is to what extent the elements of the growth pattern, which
apparently softened the conflict in, say, Taiwan, are present in other
developing countries and to what extent they are not; and, if present,
whether it is a lack of political will to make some difficult societal choices
or something else which is at fault.

Of special interest here is the issue

of whether, assuming the Taiwan pattern could be imitated, any favorable
outcome must be attributed to radical asset restructuring or whether it is
possible to achieve these desirable outcomes by a mere "tinkering with
relative prices."

In other words, by letting markets work somewhat better,

can we avoid the worsening maldistribution resulting so frequently from
rapid growth, or do we need to take some strong measures, including land,
capital and other institutional reforms?
Thus, not only might more analytical light be shed on the pieces in
the puzzle of a country like Taiwan, but the policy conclusions that might
be drawn are of substantial general interest--even if not precisely relevant
in their entirety, or in parts, elsewhere.

Government efforts at redis~

tribution by moving directly to replace the market have become more frequent
of late.

It would be highly instructive to compare--always within the mixed

economy constraint--the results of direct intervention to smooth the conflict
between distribution and growth in such countries as India with the Korea or
Taiwan experiences, using less direct intervention.

The situation of the

truly socialist countries, e.g., Cuba, China, and some of the less developed
Eastern European countries, is different; they seem to have achieved lower
levels of Gini, if with not clearly established rapid growth rates.
14 chenery, et al., op. cit., especially the country annexes.

14
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All we want to assert in the context of this paper is that there exists
conclusive evidence for at least one type of system, i.e., the mixed small,
labor-surplus economy, represented by Taiwan, to the effect that rapid
growth is compatible with both good levels and trends in the distribution
of income.

It is this record, and our attempt to understand it in terms

of its underlying growth-related causes, reported on in Section III, that
. o f the greatest potentia
. 1 interest.
•
15
is
III.

Trade-Off Optimism:

A Deviant Case

The Taiwanese growth and distribution record, in brief, is one of
unusually low levels of Gini, around .3, coupled with unusually high rates
of output growth, above 10%, during the 1960s.

Moreover, what is even more

interesting for our present purposes, is that the Gini in Taiwan did not
follow the Kuznets inverse U-shaped pattern over time.

Our data, though

sketchier for the '50s than for the '60s, indicate that the overall Gini
declined from a level of around .5 in 1953 to .4 in 1960 and held in the .3
range between 1964 and 1968, declining markedly thereafter.

In other words,

if we accept the notion that Taiwan reached the end of labor surplus at the
end of the '60s, there was in fact a substantial Gini decline once wages began
to rise significantly, as most observers would expect.

But what is much

more interesting is the virtually complete avoidance of the Kuznets effect
prior to the solution of the unemployment problem in the course of the 1960s.
Again
follows:

15

briefly, the growth side of the Taiwan story seems to be as
the typical regime of import substituting industrialization which

what follows represents a preliminary sketch of some findings of a
study being carried out, with John Fei and Shirley Kuo, for the World Bank.
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characterized Taiwanese policy from 1953 to roughly 1960 was not conducive
to employment or the related (but not identical) improvement in the dis
tribution of income in Taiwan, any more than in other developing countries.
The well-known distortion of relative factor and output prices during an
import substitution policy period yields unnecessarily capital-intensive
techniques and output mixes, as is also well known.

Even in Taiwan, employ

ment both in rural and urban areas had to take a back seat as long as capital
and imports were undervalued, and the receipt of an import license or a bank
loan, in the presence of overvalued exchange rates and low official interest
rates, bestowed large windfall profits and represented the major objective
of entrepreneurial activity.

In fact, the level of the Gini in 1953 was

about equivalent to that of most contemporary LDCs.

We should, however,

note that the basic initial conditions for an improvement were laid via
land reforms which took place in three steps during the early '50s, plus
the fortuitous impact of a fairly evenly distributed migrant flow of capital
and entrepreneurship from the Mainland in the late 1940s.

Moreover, while

Taiwan suffered from a relative neglect of agriculture, like all import
substitution cases, the heavy irrigation and institutional infrastructure
left by the Japanese colonial system made it possible for agriculture to never
theless make substantial progress even during the 1950s.

This is one way of

explaining the gradual decline of the Gini even before the advent of the
policy reforms of the early '60s.

16

We are, moreover, quite confident that

import substitution of a more flexible type, as practiced in Taiwan, prevented

16

It should, however, be noted again that the data for this period are
much less adequate and that Ginis of any reliability are only available for
agricultural income.
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the economy from getting into the well-known structural ruts experienced
by many other LDCs.

For example, unions never played any important role, and

protection, including quantitative controls and tariffs, was never quite
as severe as encountered elsewhere.

But most important of all, in an

absolute sense, the agricultural sector continued to enjoy a good deal of
favorable government attention.
Turning to the decade of the 1960s, Taiwan early on
instituted a series of major reforms, moving her from an import substitution
onto an export substitution pattern of growth. 17

As a consequence of this

shift towards an export-oriented industrial growth pattern, it became possible
for maturing industrial entrepreneurship to combine with plentiful unskilled
labor supplies for industrial production, destined both for domestic and,
increasingly, foreign markets.

Thus, the important

symbiotic relationship

between high growth rates and employment was established, culminating, by
the end of the decade, in the termination of labor surplus and the coming
of the so-called'commercialization point: 118 Fortunately, the good income
distribution data becoming available after 1964 place us in a better position
to analyze the relationship between distribution and the growth pattern during
this export substitution period.

Moreover, since growth accelerated during

the 1960s, this is also a period of greatest interest to those who want to
analyze why the Kuznets-type conflict pattern failed to put in an appearance.

17
18

see Fei and Ranis, op. cit., for more detail.

see J.C.H.Fei and G. Ranis, Development of the Labor Surplus Economy:
Theory and Policy, Richard D. Irwin, 1964.
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If we look more closely at the Taiwanese record on income distribution,
we find the overall Gini more or less constant between 1964 and 1968 at .33,
and declining substantially thereafter (i.e., by more than 10%), to about .29.
This is strong evidence that the Kuznets effect was entirely avoided before
the end of labor surplus had been reached around 1968. 19 In order to get at
the growth-related underlying sources of inequality, a decomposition of the
overall Gini, in this case

into the various relevant factor Ginis and their

•
. h ts in
. tota 1 f ami· 1 y income,
.
· d 20
re 1 ative
weig
can, moreover, be performe.

From this, a number of interesting features emerge, which permit us to push
the causal explanation much further.

However, this represents work in progress,

and we can only hint at it in the course of this paper.
For one, as we would expect, the Gini for the profit share of income
is higher than for the overall income Gini; the Gini for the wage share is
lower than the overall Gini. Moreover, the wage share itself becomes in
creasingly important over the period, rising from .4 of total income in 1964
to .5 by 1968 and to .6 by 1972.

The interpretation of this is that the wage

share rises even during the unlimited supply of labor condition, which, con
21
trary to the arguments of Arthur Lewis
and others, indicates that,
even when wages are more or less constant, labor's share can
increase as a consequence of a rapidly increasing total volume
of employment and number of hours worked per employee.

19 This turning point
around 1968 has been independently identified in
other work (see Fei and Ranis, "A Model of Growth and Employment ••• ," op. cit.),
and is linked to a substantial change in the growth pattern of real wages,
unskilled and skilled, around that time.
20 This procedure
is developed in J.C.H. Fei, G. Ranis, and S. W. Kuo,
"Growth and the Family Distribution of Income by Factor Components," Economic
Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 223, Yale University, revised January 1976.
21

W. A. Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor,"
The Manchester School, May 1954.
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•
.
. t h eorists
.
22 all have in
•
Kuznets, Artur
h
Lewis,
Marxist
and dependencia
common the view that as growth really begins to get under way in earnest,
income distribution must worsen as the profit share rises, especially in
the modern sector, and as there is greater asset accumulation by the rich
than the poor, in both sectors, and (as especially Kuznets would add) the
shift from rural to urban activities enhances the relative size of the
more unequal sector.

What this argument apparently neglects is the pos

sibility, as demonstrated by the Taiwanese case, that we may simultaneously
experience rent reductiora in agriculture and a change in the relative posi
tion of groups within the laboring class,permitting the overall Gini to be
improved by the combination of a rising functional distribution of wage
income, falling agricultural income Ginis and only slightly rising wage Ginis.
Secondly, if we divide the population into urban and rural households
and compute the overall and factor Ginis (and weights) separately, we can
see that,for rural households, the overall Gini declines during the '60s,
from .33 to .29, holding more or less steady thereafter.

This is related

to a rapid decline, as we would expect, in the importance of agricultural
income relative to non-agricultural income--the share of agricultural income
in the total falling from .66 to ',42 in the course of six years.

This

finding indicates that rural family incomes benefit as reallocation from
agriculture to non-agriculture activities proceeds if that reallocation is
not necessarily to a distant urban sector, and participated in by the richer
elements of the rural classes, but takes place in the rural areas and is
heavily represented by the relatively poorer elements of the rural population.

22

see W. Cline, "Distribution and Development," op. cit.
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Rapid rural mobilization based on the improvement of the efficiency of the
relatively poor farmers, both as farmers and as participants in the important
and growing rural industries and services,does play a decisive role in the
elimination of the Kuznets effect overall and, incidentally, its complete
absence with respect to the rural families taken by themselves.
Finally, taking the urban families separately, we find that here the
Ginis do rise slightly before the 1968 "turning point," i.e., from .33 to .34,
declining rapidly thereafter--to .29.

This indicates that here, in fact,

the Kuznets pattern does obtain, i.e., equity for the urban families under
rapid growth can improve only after the turning point when wages can begin
to rise in a sustained fashion and the growing functional distribution of
income in favor of labor once again, but now for different reasons, contributes
to an improving size distribution of income.
Looking at the entire development experience from the early '50s to the
early '70s in Taiwan, we are thus able to make the following general comments
at this stage of our understanding.

During the 1950s,

the

import substitution subphase, land reform prevented the maldistribution of
assets, a common feature of LDCs, from becoming part of the landscape.
Moreover, early on, the existence of substantial infrastructure , in the form
of irrigation, roads and such institutions as farmers' associations, per
mitted agriculture to play an important role even during the import substitu
tion phase and for land to be used rather intensively.

Land reform, which

was partly in the form of reduction of rents, partly in the sale of government lands and partly by transferring "soil to the tillers," i.e., tenancy reform,
avoided the growth of the large landless rural worker class which often

-17-

accompanies land reform and agricultural productivity increase in other
countries, thus worsening the distribution of rural income.

As a consequence,

as the small owner/operators now used family labor, larger owners were
induced to hire labor and, most importantly, landless rural workers and/or
small or poor owner/operators could be absorbed into the rapidly growing
secondary activities in agriculture.

These activities included not only

rural industries and services but also such secondary crops as vegetables,
mushrooms, asparagus, etc., which played an important role in the Taiwanese
case.

Rural works programs generated at the local level by local initiative

also played a complementary role in providing additional employment oppor
tunities, but, more importantly, in clearing the way for the aforementioned
increases in the directly productive activities, in food producing agricul
ture, in secondary crops, and in rural industry and service activities.
In the 1960s, when the growth regime changed to one of export substitu
tion, rapid, export-oriented industrialization was accompanied by a sub
stantially enhanced growth of agricultural productivity, especially when the
high yielding varieties were superimposed on an already very productive and
research-oriented food producing agricultural sector.

Here again, as we

know from other country experience, who gets the new technology and can use
it in terms of the availability of other inputs, water, credit, infrastruc
ture, etc., and what are the mechanization side effects of the high yielding
varieties

on

labor absorption, are among the critical issues.

In Taiwan,

it is quite clear that the unit of cultivation did not change very much as a
consequence of increased agricultural productivity; that mechanization was held
in abeyance until the end of the decade when labor surplus began to disappear;

-18-

and that agricultural income at its source, if we look at the Gini for
agricultural income as such, did not worsen.

Even more important was the

already mentioned rapid growth of rural industries and servi9es and their
relatively labor-intensive characteristic.

This latter feature

. d.icates t h e important
.
1
. h we h ave examine
. d e 1sewh ere, 23 in
wh ic
roe
decentralized industrialization efforts can play in avoiding some of the
costs of dualistic growth that have been pointed to by Arthur Lewis,
Kuznets and others.

Agriculture is basically a constant returns industry,

with the technology of the high yielding varieties essentially scale-neutral.
Thus, if the normal S-curve of the adoption of new varieties is permitted
to play itself out,

24

there need be no fear of a possible conflict between

the two societal objectives.

Once the problem of who gets the benefits is

solved, once the farmers' association type of institutional network pro
vides possibilities for not only generating the agricultural surplus at its
source but for channeling it into rural activities,understood and owned by
the farmers themselves, the key ingredients for the absence of conflict and
maximum mutual reinforcement are present.
It is not possible in the context of this paper to go into a
detailed analysis of the underlying causes of the softening and virtual
elimination of the Kuznets effect in the case of the Taiwanese rapid growth
experience.

The above discussion is merely intended as illustrative of the train

theme of this paper, namely, that the analysis of at least one deviant

23G._Ranis, "Industrial Sector Labor Absorption," Economic Development
and Cultural Change, 21, No. 3, 1973, pp. 387-408.
24 rt would certainly be the height of folly to curb further diffusion
of technology because of avoidable deleterious distributional effects.
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country case in which growth, employment and distribution were mutually
reinforcing,rat her than competitive, should give us all some pause--and
perhaps lead us to examine particular facets of other country situations
more carefully before we accept the inevitability of conflict.

IV.

Conclusions

In summarizing the five country case studies included as an annex to
the Chenery et al. volume,

25

Jolly presented a number of conclusions which

he felt could be derived from these, admittedly sketchy, attempts to look
at income redistribution and growth experience in a number of very different
countries.

He pointed out,quite correctly,that in the socialist countries

in the sample, i.e., Cuba and Tanzania at least, whatever income redistribu
tion-occurred was the result of conscious government policy directed toward
that objective, and that the income distribution results in a more market
oriented mixed economy like Taiwan, were more the by-product of policies
aimed at growth.

It is important, however, to note that the Gini in

Tanzania, .48, as well as the growth rates in both Tanzania and Cuba compare
rather unfavorably at least as of this date; in fact, as Jolly also points out,
the only two cases of very rapid growth accompanied by redistribution seem
to have occurred in the Korea/Taiwan cases.
We recognize that all the returns are not in, especially with respect
to the Mainland China experience.

Nevertheless, at this stage of our under

standing, we may conclude that the achievement of substantial complementarity

2

5Redistribution with Growth, op. cit.
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between growth and redistribution may be possible in a labor surplus socialist
LDC following the Chinese pattern, with all its implications for total
societal mobilization.

On the other hand, if a country has chosen a mixed

economy pattern--wherever it decides to locate itself on the wide spectrum
of available institutional/political choices--it is likely to be very diffi
cult to achieve a happy combination of growth and redistribution via direct
interventions by government on behalf of the poor.

If there is one thing

the Bardhan piece on India illustrates extremely we11, 26 it is that every
time mixed economy governments intervene on behalf of the poor, the poor
find themselves worse off .. We do not wish to get into the question of
whether this is due to an imperfect understanding on the part of the elite
of how the system really works, or an all-too-perfect understanding.

Be

that

as it may, one positive conclusion, for us at least, is that just as the
market mechanism can be (and has been) used as an instrument for growth in
some Eastern European socialist countries, it may be the only reliable device
to minimize the conflict between growth and redistribution in a mixed de
veloping economy.
Secondly, while we are willing to accept the "specialness" of the
Taiwanese experience in terms of the peculiar constellation of good initial
conditions inherited from the Japanese, as well as the political realities
since, it seems foolish to waive aside this deviant experience as readily
as is often the case.

Certainly the argument that spectacular growth was

related to the singularly heavy inflow of U.S. capital is factually incorrect.
26
27

27

Redistribution with Growth, op. cit., Annex.

roreign capital may have been strategically important,
facilitate the transition from import to export substitution.
tative impact has been much exaggerated (for details, see Fei
Model of Growth and Employment •.• ," op. cit.). Moreover, why
growth should have particularly egalitarian effects in Taiwan
has never really been satisfactorily addressed.

especially to
But its quanti
and Ranis, "A
U.S. assisted
and not elsewhere
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The point that can and should be made instead is that the Taiwan experience
demonstrates that market allocations do not have to work on behalf of the
rich but can be made to work on behalf of the poor--at least if two condi
tions are met, i.e., assets, both in agriculture and non-.agriculture, are
not very unequally distributed at the outset, and relative prices are reason
ably realistic indicators of resource availabilities.

It is thus incorrect

to say that "we tried our best for growth in the '60s" and that we must now
"try our best for distribution," or that "we tried liberal refonns in the '60s"
and "must now reach for the radical medicine bottle."

Both judgments

seem premature since we have seldom really tried "tinkering with relative
prices" in the presence of relatively favorable initial asset conditions.
The LDC record of the last two decades, in short, is a poor basis for
judging the inevitability or lack of inevitability of a conflict in employ
ment, distribution and output objectives.

It may thus be seriously misleading

with respect to the future, given the policy package which obtained in most
of the developing world during the '50s and '60s, and, in fact, continues
to dominate the landscape to this day.

Especially in the labor surplus

economy context, it is easy to document at least the theoretical possibility
of increasing both output and employment at the same time that income dis
tribution does not deteriorate and possibly even improves.

The case of

Taiwan, moreover, gives us a real live example that this is also factually
possible to achieve as an LDC moves into its export substitution subphase
of transition growth.
In our view, the problem, frankly, is not mainly a technical one.
Based on our own understanding of the Taiwanese case to date, there is no
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reason why, with the proper set of policies, many LDCs could not have their
cake and eat it too, perhaps twice over, i.e., by choosing a more labor
intensive and participatory growth path.

In the case of Taiwan, this meant

shifting from a relatively enlightened and flexible import substitution
regime into a trade-oriented industrial export regime over time.

It also

meant early attention to agricultural infrastructure and productivity in
crease and to a decentralized rural industrial growth pattern, with output
mixes and technologies continuously responsive to changing factor endowments.
Effecting such changes requires,of course,political agreement among the
various major parties to the social contract, and is much easier to accom
plish when the resistance offered by vested interests,which have grown up
under import substitution,is relatively small and/or the government is
relatively strong.

Both conditions were met in Taiwan.

That landless rural

workers, small farmers and other target groups are bound to benefit from
such changes in strategy is clear enough.

But it is often less clear that,

if landlords or large-scale industrialists are to be penalized, it would not
necessarily have to be in the nature of a permanent penalty.

Rather, it is

likely to call for changes in the way in which incomes are earned, e.g., in
the case of industrialists, a shift from windfall profits derived from
government-induced restraints of competition, cheap capital imports, low
interest rates, etc., to profits earned by participating in the expanding
industrial export markets.
As has been pointed out elsewhere,

28

28 the alternative of "business as

e.g., G. Ranis, "Employment, Equity and Growth: Lessons from the
Philippine Employment Mission," International Labour Review, 110, No. 1,
July 1974.
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usual" in most of the developing countries is likely to lead to a
continuing build-up of social and political pressures by those who take
the current rhetoric seriously.

Also--and this is a point less well

understood--the ultimate souring of even private rates of return in narrowly
constrained LDC industrial sectors as domestic markets continue to dwindle
and the process of fuelling import substitution becomes increasingly ex
pensive and likely to boomerang on the elite classes themselves.

Even

bonanzas of the oil and other traditional natural resources variety, unless
indefinitely and generously sustained, may serve only to put off the day of
reckoning.
In spite of the increasing atmospherics of confrontationis m between
North and South, as well as rich and poor within each,

this observer is

not yet ready to accept the conspiracy theory that''vested interests do not
intend to change anything but their rhetoric." I am, rather, more inclined
to the interpretation that it is very understandable and human for such
interests to try to avoid unpleasant decisions if there is a ready-made
alternative at hand--such as a boom in traditional exports or the successful
search for new ones--and/or if foreign capital flows permit the maintenance
of the present narrow structure of growth.

Growth rates can be maintained

in this fashion--as the record of the '50s and '60s indicates--but it is
much more doubtful how long the increasing disparity between what is said
about equity and what is done about it can be tolerated.

We recognize that

it is only some donors and a small minority of the spokesmen of the developing
world who are now insisting on a more equity-and poverty-oriente d development
pattern.

Developing societies, like ours, are poly-centered and complicated.
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All we can do as political economists--which we are forced to be, whether
we like it or not--is to improve our understanding of the causal relation
ships between growth and equity and to point out the extent to which
societies that are not yet on the frontier could, in fact, improve their
position

with respect to both objectives.

